财经问题研究

划转部分国有资本充实社保基金，不仅有利于扎实推进共同富裕，也有利于国有企业提升经营效率，从而实现充实社保账户和国有资本保值增值的双重目标。本文以国有企业投资效率为切入点，基于2011—2023年中国沪深A股上市国有企业数据，利用双重差分模型实证检验国有资本划转社保基金对国有企业投资效率的影响及作用机制。研究发现，国有资本划转社保基金能够提升国有企业投资效率，该结论在一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立；国有资本划转社保基金通过减少政府干预、改善公司治理和提高分红力度提升国有企业投资效率；国有资本划转社保基金对国有企业投资效率的提升作用在业绩表现较强、成长前景较强、社保压力较大的企业中更显著；国有资本划转社保基金对国有企业投资效率的提升作用在省社保基金、省财政厅、省国资委三种股权管理主体中依次递减；相较于在股东大会行使表决权，承接主体委派董事的治理效果更强。本文研究不仅对国有资本划转社保基金的理论研究作出了创新性拓展，也为做好养老金融大文章和深化国有企业改革提供了政策参考。

The transfer of state capital to social security funds converts the fruits of state-owned economic development into a sustainable funding source for social security. As an institutional innovation bridging the two systems of social security and state capital regulation, the central proposition post-transfer lies in whether this process can simultaneously improve the efficiency of state capital, achieving the organic unity of sustainable pension development and the preservation and appreciation of state assets. While prior research has focused on the macro-level effects of this transfer policy, scant attention has been paid to its micro-level governance mechanisms and subsequent economic consequences at the firm level.This study investigates the impact of transferring state capital to social security funds on the investment decisions of local state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Leveraging a staggered pilot implementation across Chinese provincial-level regions from 2011 to 2023 as a quasi-natural experiment, this study finds that the policy significantly enhances SOE investment efficiency. Mechanism tests reveal that this effect operates through clarifying government-enterprise relations, optimizing internal governance, and increasing dividend payouts. Examining policy implementation heterogeneity, this study finds that the post-transfer equity management entity exhibits three types(provincial social security funds, finance bureaus, and state-owned assets supervision and administration commissions) with governance effects diminishing in that order. Moreover, the governance effect is substantially stronger when the undertaking entity directly appoints directors and executives rather than merely exercising voting rights at shareholder meetings. Cross-sectional analyses show that the policy's benefits are more pronounced in SOEs with stronger performance and growth prospects, as well as in regions facing greater pension funding pressure.This study makes two primary contributions. On one hand, by examining the micro-level governance effects of the transfer policy and highlighting the critical role of post-transfer governance heterogeneity, this study extends the research perspective on the economic consequences of transferring state capital to social security funds. On the other hand, from the vantage point of state equity reallocation, our findings demonstrate that this policy enhances state capital efficiency by introducing heterogeneous state shareholders while maintaining ultimate state control, offering a novel pathway for improving state asset efficiency.These findings underscore that activating the governance function of the undertaking entity and reconciling its objectives with those of state asset regulators are crucial for realizing the dual goals of sustainable pension funds and state capital appreciation.