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深刻理解产业政策的运行特征是促进产业政策有效转型的重要前提。本文从政府工作报告中提取关键词,以识别2003—2022年省、市级政府的产业政策,全方位、多角度刻画中国地方产业政策的特征事实。研究发现:产业政策数量与经济发展阶段密切相关,产业政策数量随着人均国内生产总值和市场化指数的增加而减少;产业政策实施年数普遍较短且广泛存在实施间断情况;产业政策行业分布差异显著,产业政策实施数量和产业政策实施年数在行业间、行业内都分布不均;产业政策在同级政府间与上下级政府间均具有相似性;产业政策网络连接较为松散且聚类系数不断下降。本文的研究为中国产业政策研究奠定了数据基础。
Abstract:A comprehensive understanding of the operational characteristics of the industrial policy is a crucial prerequisite for promoting its appropriate and effective transformation. Existing literature has primarily focused on evaluating the effectiveness of the industrial policy. However, the empirical findings vary widely. The long-standing controversy over policy effectiveness stems mainly from the difficulty in accurately measuring its effects. This paper attempts to summarize the stylized facts of local industrial policy by leveraging rich textual data from government reports. First, this paper extracts and measures industrial policies from provincial and municipal government work reports from 2003 to 2022, yielding 1 257 provincial-level and 14 309 municipal-level policy entries, respectively. Then, based on this extensive dataset, this paper summarizes the basic characteristics of China's local industrial policy in the dimensions of time, industry, government level, and region, providing policy implications to promote industrial policy transformation. This paper summarizes the stylized facts of China's local industrial policy into five aspects. First, the quantity of industrial policies is closely associated with the stage of economic development. For both provincial and municipal governments, the number of industrial policies decreases as GDP per capita and the marketization index increase. However, the number of policies for strategic emerging industries(SEIs) grows with these same indicators. Second, the implementation duration of industrial policies is generally short. The average implementation lengths for provincial and municipal policies are 2.290 years and 2.280 years, respectively. Concurrently, policy implementation is characterized by widespread discontinuity. Third, the quantity and duration of policies vary significantly both across and within industries. Notably, the number of policies targeting high-end manufacturing, SEIs, and technology-intensive industries is increasing annually. Fourth, industrial policies exhibit meaningful similarity among peer governments as well as across hierarchical levels. Similarity among governments at the same administrative level is lower when policies are classified at the four-digit industry level than at the two-digit level. The industrial policy of cities within the same province displays slightly higher similarity than that of cities overall. Vertical similarity between upper-lower-level governments follows a U-shaped pattern. Fifth, industrial policies exhibit a core-periphery network structure. Core-node cities are few but highly connected, while peripheral cities are numerous but sparsely connected.The policy implications of this paper are as follows. Industrial policies should be timely in both their implementation and cessation; long-term perspectives and coherence should be emphasized; local governments should adhere to a path of specialization and differentiation, while rationally aligning with the developmental intentions of higher-level governments.
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(1)本文特征事实分析部分所用数据由《财经问题研究》网站提供专门链接,有需要的读者可以自行下载。20250613
(1)本文将制造业分为高端、中端、低端三类。高端制造业包括:化学原料和化学制品制造业;医药制药业;化学纤维制造业;通用设备制造业;专用设备制造业;汽车制造业;铁路、船舶、航空航天和其他运输设备制造业;电器机械和器材制造业;计算机、通信和其他电子设备制造业;仪器仪表制造业;金属制品、机械和设备修理业。中端制造业包括:石油加工、炼焦和核燃料加工业;橡胶和塑料制品业;非金属矿物制品业;黑色金属冶炼和压延加工业;有色金属冶炼和压延加工业;金属制品业;废弃资源综合利用业。低端制造业包括:农副食品加工业;食品制造业;酒、饮料和精制茶制造业;烟草制品业;纺织业;纺织服装、服饰业;皮革、毛皮、羽毛及其制品和制鞋业;木材加工和木、竹、藤、棕、草制品业;家具制造业;造纸和纸制品业;印刷和记录媒介复制业;文教、工美、体育和娱乐用品制造业;其他制造业。
(1)劳动密集型制造业包括:农副食品加工业;食品制造业;酒、饮料和精制茶制造业;烟草制品业;纺织业;纺织服装、服饰业;皮革、毛皮、羽毛及其制品和制鞋业;木材加工和木、竹、藤、棕、草制品业;家具制造业;文教、工美、体育和娱乐用品制造业;其他制造业;废弃资源综合利用业;金属制品、机械和设备修理业。资本密集型制造业包括:造纸和纸制品业;印刷和记录媒介复制业;石油加工、炼焦和核燃料加工业;橡胶和塑料制品业;非金属矿物制品业;黑色金属冶炼和压延加工业;有色金属冶炼和压延加工业;金属制品业。技术密集型制造业包括:化学原料和化学制品制造业;医药制药业;化学纤维制造业;通用设备制造业;专用设备制造业;汽车制造业;铁路、船舶、航空航天和其他运输设备制造业;电器机械和器材制造业;计算机、通信和其他电子设备制造业;仪器仪表制造业。
(1)产业政策网络结构图未在正文中列出,留存备索。
(1)东北地区包括黑龙江、辽宁和吉林;中部内陆地区包括山西、河南、安徽、湖北、湖南和江西;中部沿海地区包括江苏、浙江和上海;京津地区包括北京和天津;北部沿海地区包括山东、河北;南部沿海地区包括福建、广东和海南;西北地区包括内蒙古、陕西、宁夏、甘肃、青海和新疆;西南地区包括四川、重庆、云南、贵州、广西和西藏。
基本信息:
DOI:10.19654/j.cnki.cjwtyj.2025.12.001
中图分类号:F120
引用信息:
[1]吕冰洋,肖乃夫,曾傅雯.中国地方产业政策的特征事实——基于政府工作报告的文本分析[J].财经问题研究,2025,No.505(12):3-17.DOI:10.19654/j.cnki.cjwtyj.2025.12.001.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金面上项目“中国增值税大规模减税退税的微观测算和经济效应研究”(72373148); 习近平经济思想研究中心课题研究项目资助