nav emailalert searchbtn searchbox tablepage yinyongbenwen piczone journalimg journalInfo journalinfonormal searchdiv searchzone qikanlogo popupnotification paper paperNew
2023, 09, No.478 94-104
地方政府债务、企业融资约束与企业创新
基金项目(Foundation):
邮箱(Email):
DOI: 10.19654/j.cnki.cjwtyj.2023.09.008
摘要:

在经济高质量发展阶段,地方政府债务对企业创新的影响需要充分考虑企业融资约束的制约。本文基于2009—2019年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,采用固定效应模型和门槛模型检验地方政府债务对企业创新的影响,以及企业融资约束对二者关系的作用机制。基准回归结果表明,地方政府债务对企业创新有显著的负向影响,地方政府债务规模越大,越可能抑制企业创新。门槛回归结果表明,地方政府债务对企业创新具有显著且单一的门槛效应。在门槛值以内时,地方政府债务能够促进企业创新;一旦跨过门槛值,地方政府债务会抑制企业创新。机制分析结果表明,地方政府债务显著提升了企业融资成本,其通过企业融资约束抑制企业创新。异质性分析结果表明,地方政府债务对非国有企业、小企业和东部企业创新的负向影响更明显。以上结论既可以为理解地方政府债务在企业创新中的作用提供新的视角,也可以为防范地方政府债务风险和促进企业创新等提供参考。

Abstract:

The expansion of local government debt has promoted regional infrastructure construction and domestic investment growth, which is conducive to improving people's livelihoods and promoting employment. However, it may also squeeze out financial resources, increase enterprise financing costs, and hinder enterprise innovation. At the stage of high-quality economic development, the impact of local government debt on enterprise innovation needs to fully consider enterprise financing constraints. Existing research fails to explain the impact of local government debt on enterprise innovation at the micro level.This paper discusses the relations among local government debt, enterprise financing constraints with enterprise innovation. Based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2019,we explore the impact of local government debt on enterprise innovation and the mechanism of enterprise financing constraints through fixed effects and threshold models. Benchmark regression results indicate that local government debt has a significantly negative impact on enterprise innovation. The larger the scale of local government debt, the more easily enterprise innovation is constrained. Regression results based on endogeneity and robustness tests support the significant negative impact of local government debt, indicating that the benchmark regression results are robust. Threshold regression results indicate that local government debt has a significant and single threshold effect on enterprise innovation. Within the threshold, local government debt promotes enterprise innovation; once the threshold is exceeded, it will inhibit enterprise innovation. Mechanism analysis shows that local government debt significantly increases financing costs of enterprises, and thus suppresses enterprise innovation. Heterogeneity analysis shows that local government debt has a more significantly inhibitory effect on innovation in non-state-owned enterprises, small enterprises, and enterprises in the eastern region.This paper contributes to existing literature in the following two aspects. Firstly, at the enterprise level, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relations among local government debt, financing constraints and enterprise innovation, which is conducive to revealing the mechanism of the impact of local government debt on economy. Secondly,we test the impact of local government debt on enterprise innovation, confirming its significant and single threshold effect.In addition, the paper expands the research scope of local government debt and enriches research results in this field.Studying the relations among local government debt, enterprise financing constraints, and enterprise innovation can not only provide reference for policy formulation, but also provide guidance for economic growth and technological progress.The paper provides a new perspective for understanding the role of local government debt in enterprise innovation, and provides reference for preventing local government debt risks and promoting enterprise innovation.

参考文献

[1]孙立,陈朴.不对称信息背景下地方政府债务期限结构与利率溢价之间的关系研究[J].经济体制改革,2019(5):187-194.

[2]毛锐,刘楠楠,刘蓉.地方政府债务扩张与系统性金融风险的触发机制[J].中国工业经济,2018(4):19-38.

[3]范剑勇,莫家伟.地方债务、土地市场与地区工业增长[J].经济研究,2014,49(1):41-55.

[4]吕健.地方债务对经济增长的影响分析——基于流动性的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(11):16-31.

[5]毛捷,黄春元.地方债务、区域差异与经济增长——基于中国地级市数据的验证[J].金融研究,2018(5):1-19.

[6]杨云.城投债影响经济增长——规模与资金用途结构的作用[J].经济科学,2019(2):27-39.

[7]刘畅,曹光宇,马光荣.地方政府融资平台挤出了中小企业贷款吗?[J].经济研究,2020,55(3):50-64.

[8]余海跃,康书隆.地方政府债务扩张、企业融资成本与投资挤出效应[J].世界经济,2020,43(7):49-72.

[9]张中华,万其龙.地方政府债务挤出了私人投资吗?[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),2018,38(7):3-18.

[10]胡援成,张文君.地方政府债务扩张与银行信贷风险[J].财经论丛,2012(3):59-65.

[11]韩旺红,马瑞超.FDI、融资约束与企业创新[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2013(2):104-110.

[12]张璇,刘贝贝,汪婷,等.信贷寻租、融资约束与企业创新[J].经济研究,2017,52(5):161-174.

[13] HUANG Y, PAGANO M, PANIZZA U. Local crowding-out in China[J]. The journal of finance, 2020,75(6):2855-2898.

[14]陈诗一,汪莉.中国地方债务与区域经济增长[J].学术月刊,2016,48(6):37-52.

[15]王博,赵森杨,罗荣华,等.地方政府债务、空间溢出效应与区域经济增长[J].金融研究,2022(8):18-37.

[16]马树才,华夏,韩云虹.地方政府债务如何挤出实体企业信贷融资?——来自中国工业企业的微观证据[J].国际金融研究,2020(5):3-13.

[17]李玉龙.地方政府债券、土地财政与系统性金融风险[J].财经研究,2019,45(9):100-113.

[18]熊虎,沈坤荣.地方政府债务对创新的挤出效应研究[J].经济科学,2019(4):5-17.

[19]范亚琴,池晓辉.地方政府债务的挤出效应及其对企业融资约束的影响[J].上海金融,2021(4):2-12.

[20]徐彦坤.地方政府债务如何影响企业投融资行为?[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2020(2):90-99+159-160.

[21]李尚蒲,郑仲晖,罗必良.资源基础、预算软约束与地方政府债务[J].当代财经,2015(10):28-38.

[22] BOYD J H, DE NICOLóG. The theory of bank risk taking and competition revisited[J]. The journal of finance,2005,60(3):1329-1343.

[23]胡山,余泳泽.数字经济与企业创新:突破性创新还是渐进性创新?[J].财经问题研究,2022(1):42-51.

[24]熊琛,金昊.地方政府债务的宏观经济效应——基于信贷错配视角的研究[J].经济学(季刊),2021,21(5):1545-1570.

[25]刘欢,周会洋,侯粲然.地方政府债务与企业创新[J].会计研究,2020(9):163-177.

[26]朱晨赫,杨筝,程晨.地方政府债务与企业创新——基于省级面板数据和国务院43号文件的实证研究[J].当代财经,2018(8):77-89.

[27]李双建,田国强.地方政府债务扩张与银行风险承担:理论模拟与经验证据[J].经济研究,2022,57(5):34-50.

[28]刘贯春,程飞阳,姚守宇,等.地方政府债务治理与企业投融资期限错配改善[J].管理世界,2022,38(11):71-89.

[29]鄢伟波,安磊.社会保险缴费与转嫁效应[J].经济研究,2021,56(9):107-123.

[30]徐军伟,毛捷,管星华.地方政府隐性债务再认识——基于融资平台公司的精准界定和金融势能的视角[J].管理世界,2020,36(9):37-59.

[31] HADLOCK C J, PIERCE J R. New evidence on measuring financial constraints:moving beyond the KZ index[J].The review of financial studies,2010,23(5):1909-1940.

[32]饶品贵,汤晟,李晓溪.地方政府债务的挤出效应:基于企业杠杆操纵的证据[J].中国工业经济,2022(1):151-169.

[33] DEMIRCI I, HUANG J, SIALM C. Government debt and corporate leverage:international evidence[J]. Journal of financial economics, 2019, 133(2):337-356.

[34]孙健夫,贺佳.财税支持政策对新能源汽车产业研发效率的效应分析[J].软科学,2021,35(1):56-61.

[35]熊虎,沈坤荣.地方政府债务对非国有企业投资效率的影响研究[J].当代财经,2019(2):37-48.

[36]段军山,庄旭东.金融投资行为与企业技术创新——动机分析与经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2021(1):155-173.

[37] HANSEN B E. Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels:estimation, testing, and inference[J]. Journal of econometrics,1999,93(2):345-368.

[38]张莉芳.政府补贴、国际化战略和企业创新能力——基于中国战略性新兴产业的经验研究[J].商业研究,2018(6):151-160.

(1)稳健性检验结果未在正文中列出,留存备索。

(1)地方政府债务平衡点图未在正文中列出,留存备索。

基本信息:

DOI:10.19654/j.cnki.cjwtyj.2023.09.008

中图分类号:F812.5;F832.51;F275;F273.1

引用信息:

[1]郑洁,袁洋,李国豪.地方政府债务、企业融资约束与企业创新[J].财经问题研究,2023,No.478(09):94-104.DOI:10.19654/j.cnki.cjwtyj.2023.09.008.

发布时间:

2023-08-11

出版时间:

2023-08-11

网络发布时间:

2023-08-11

检 索 高级检索