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农业基础设施建设在乡村振兴中扮演重要角色。本文基于2000—2021年县级层面数据,采用双重差分模型实证检验“省直管县”改革对农业基础设施建设的影响及作用机制。研究结果显示:“省直管县”改革能够促进农业基础设施建设;“省直管县”改革对农业基础设施建设的促进作用在经济弱县、低市场化地区和高工业化地区更明显;“省直管县”改革通过增强县域财政能力和提高财力与事权匹配程度促进农业基础设施建设;不同改革形式的改革效应存在差异,“行政+财政”改革对农业基础设施建设的促进作用优于单一行政改革和单一财政改革;“省直管县”改革对农业基础设施建设具有长期促进作用,改革力度越大,“省直管县”改革对农业基础设施建设的促进作用越大。本文的研究结论为推动乡村振兴、完善财政体制、建立财力与事权更加匹配的财税制度提供了经验证据。
Abstract:County-level governments have generally faced weakened fiscal capacity following the reform of rural taxes and fees. To alleviate grassroots fiscal pressure, many provinces have implemented the “province-managing-county”(PMC) reform. By enhancing provincial fiscal support and expanding county-level autonomy, this reform seeks to realign fiscal resources and administrative authority below the provincial level, thereby improving county governance. Against this backdrop, this paper investigates the impact of PMC reform on agricultural infrastructure construction, with a particular focus on how intergovernmental fiscal relations and the alignment of fiscal resources and administrative authority shape investment mechanisms for rural infrastructure. This paper aims to provide both empirical evidence and theoretical insights for refining the rural revitalization policy system.Employing a quasi-natural experiment design and county-level panel data from 2000 to 2021, this paper empirically examines the effects of PMC reform. The results demonstrate that PMC significantly promotes agricultural infrastructure construction. Different reform types exhibit varying impacts: the combined “administrative + fiscal” reform is more effective than either single administrative or single fiscal reform. Mechanism analysis indicates that PMC improves agricultural infrastructure primarily by enhancing county-level fiscal capacity and strengthening the alignment between fiscal resources and administrative authority. Heterogeneity analysis further reveals that the reform effects are conditioned by the levels of economic development, marketization, and industrialization. Moreover, PMC exerts a sustained positive influence on agricultural infrastructure construction, with stronger reform intensity generating greater benefits.This paper makes three contributions. First, by examining the relationship between PMC reform and agricultural infrastructure, it enriches literature on the impact of decentralization reforms on infrastructure development. Second, by distinguishing reform types and intensities, it offers deeper insights into how different matching strategies affect infrastructure outcomes, thereby increasing both theoretical and practical value. Third, the findings demonstrate that at the sub-provincial level, aligning fiscal resources with administrative authority produces the most significant and durable benefits for agricultural infrastructure, providing valuable policy implications for advancing fiscal reform below the provincial level.
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(1)《中共吉林省委吉林省人民政府关于印发〈吉林省深化扩权强县改革试点实施方案〉的通知》(吉发[2013]16号)、《四川省人民政府关于深化和扩大扩权强县试点工作的通知》(川府发[2009] 12号)等。
(1)大规模的“省直管县”改革始于2004年,本文的数据从2000年开始,能够覆盖改革前的时间,有助于进行事前趋势检验。同时,本文相关县域数据最晚更新至2021年,涵盖了改革后的较长观察期。
(2)下文统称县、县级市、区、旗为县。
(1)事前趋势检验与安慰剂检验的结果未在正文中列出,留存备索。
(1)稳健性检验结果未在正文中列出,留存备索。
(1)长期效应分析结果未在正文中列出,留存备索。
基本信息:
DOI:10.19654/j.cnki.cjwtyj.2025.10.007
中图分类号:F323;F812.8
引用信息:
[1]冯海波,雷衍笑,徐咏仪.农业基础设施建设中财力与事权的匹配效应——基于“省直管县”改革的准自然实验[J].财经问题研究,2025,No.503(10):78-90.DOI:10.19654/j.cnki.cjwtyj.2025.10.007.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重点项目“多维减税手段激励企业创新效果的差异性及政策优化研究”(20AJY023)