财经问题研究

中央与地方财政事权和支出责任划分是建立现代财税体制的重要内容，但分税制改革以来，财政事权划分不清、支出责任归属不明等问题依然存在。本文构建了一个关于中央与地方支出责任划分的优化模型，将支出责任划分简化为市场承担、中央独担、地方独担和央地共担四种模式，通过理论分析和数值模拟发现：不存在普适的支出责任划分模式，四种模式在不同场景下都可能成为最优模式；当政府的能力越强、固有职能越少、成本系数越小时，该政府越可能承担更多的支出责任；对于央地共担模式，政府能力增强会增加其支出责任，政府固有职能增加或政府成本系数增大会减少其支出责任，这些发现得到了政策文本的支持。鉴于此，本文提出财政事权与支出责任划分的政策建议：明确政府与市场的边界及各级政府间的边界，不断完善财政事权与支出责任划分的动态调整机制，总体上适当加强中央事权，并提高中央财政支出比重，在部分领域重新划分财政事权与支出责任。本文为中央与地方财政事权和支出责任划分提供了一个理论框架，为推动财税体制改革提供了理论支持。

Since the tax-sharing reform, problems such as unclear allocation of fiscal authority, ambiguous assignment of expenditure responsibilities, and the lack of explicit criteria for determining allocation shares have persisted. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a systematic analysis of the allocation of fiscal authority and expenditure responsibilities.This paper constructs an optimization model of expenditure responsibilities involving a central government and a local government. The allocation of expenditure responsibilities is simplified into four modes: market provision, exclusive central government responsibility, exclusive local government responsibility, and shared responsibility between central and local governments. Government characteristics, including government capacity, inherent functions, and cost coefficients, are incorporated into the model to characterize the features of both central and local governments. The results show that there is no universally applicable mode of expenditure responsibility allocation. When a government has stronger capacity, fewer inherent functions, and lower cost coefficients, it is more likely to assume a larger share of expenditure responsibilities. Under the shared-responsibility mode, an increase in government capacity raises its allocation share of expenditure responsibilities, whereas increases in inherent functions or cost coefficients reduce it. Under specific political objectives, it is more likely to assume fiscal authority and expenditure responsibilities exclusively.This paper argues that the boundary between government and market should be clearly defined to reasonably determine the bearer of fiscal authority. The division of responsibilities between central and local governments should be clarified by determining appropriate allocation modes and allocation shares according to differences in government capacity, inherent functions, and cost coefficients. A dynamic adjustment mechanism for the allocation of fiscal authority and expenditure responsibilities should be improved, so that allocation arrangements can be adjusted in a timely manner as government characteristics change. Overall, the central fiscal authority should be strengthened, and the share of central fiscal expenditure should be increased, while existing allocation arrangements in certain fields should be further optimized.The marginal contributions of this paper are threefold. First, it formulates the allocation of fiscal authority and expenditure responsibilities as an optimization decision problem and establishes a general theoretical framework. Second, by assigning different values to exogenous parameters in the model, it simulates various external scenarios and examines the optimal allocation modes of expenditure responsibilities under different conditions. Third, it analyzes transitions among optimal allocation modes and further summarizes the main patterns through which changes in exogenous parameters affect allocation shares of expenditure responsibilities under the shared-responsibility mode.